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PERSPECTIVE
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The enforcement of awards following a decision at the seat
remains a controversial issue in international arbitration. Should an
enforcement court follow the decision of the seat court, or can the
enforcement court reach a different conclusion? US, English, and
French courts continue to take different approaches to this issue. The
position may not be so different in Asian courts.
While, at first blush, it may be thought that an award which has
been set aside by a supervisory court cannot be enforced in any other
jurisdiction, there is an emerging body of cases which suggests
otherwise. The emerging case law does not give the seat the preeminent prominence in the determination of the validity of the award
as one would think it deserves. French courts disregard the decisions
of seat courts altogether. In a series of cases, French courts have
enforced awards that have been set aside or suspended at the seat of
arbitration. The French courts have provided two justifications for
their approach:
1. French domestic law does not recognize the setting aside or
suspension of the award as a ground for refusing enforcement.
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2. French courts consider that an international arbitral award is
not “anchored” or “integrated” in the seat of arbitration.
Therefore, the views of seat courts on the validity of the award
simply have no bearing on whether the award should be enforced
in France.

Some commentators favor the French approach. In Gaillard’s view,
international arbitration is a transnational legal order in which no state
should have the final say on the validity of the award. Accordingly,
each enforcement court should be entitled to form its own view on the
validity of the award, regardless of what the courts at the seat of
arbitration may think.
As Emmanuel Gaillard has observed:
The idea that the New York Convention would place the seat of
the arbitration at the top of a jurisdictional hierarchy for
enforcement purposes is counter to its fundamental objectives. If
accepted, it would shift the focus from the award itself, which is
the subject matter of the Convention, to the judicial process
surrounding the award in the country where it was rendered, and
would fly in the face of one of the greatest achievements of the
New York Convention. Indeed, one must recall that the drafters
of the Convention set out to abolish the requirement of double
exequatur, which governed enforcement under the 1927 Geneva
Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.1

In Société Hilmarton v. Société O.T.V,2 the French court had to
consider whether to recognize an award that had been set aside in its
country of origin, Switzerland. The Cour de Cassation held that the
award in question was, “an international award which was not
integrated into the Swiss . . . legal order, such that its existence
continued in spite of its being set aside.”3 The decision in Hilmarton
was explained by the Cour de Cassation in Société PT Putrabali
Adyamulia c/ SA Rena Holdings4: the impact of a national court’s
decision to annul an award is confined to its own jurisdiction and that
the enforcement court decides whether to enforce based on its own
rules. In other words, the French approach is that the French courts
1. Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration as a Transnational System of Justice, in
ARBITRATION—THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS 71 (ICCA Congress Series No. 16, 2012) (emphasis
added).
2. The Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 23 March 1994, Rev. Arb. 327.
3. Id.
4. 1ère civ., 29 June 2007.
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may still enforce an award which has been set aside by the
supervisory court.
A recent case dealt with this very issue. In Yukos Capital S.a.r.L
v. OJSC Oil Company Rosneft,5 the English High Court was required
to consider whether to recognize a decision of a foreign court setting
aside an award and to take into account whether the decision in
question was obtained by fraud and to apply principles of natural
justice and English public policy. In September 2006, Yukos Capital
obtained four arbitral awards (“Awards”) against a former Yukos
entity taken over by a Russian state-owned Rosneft and began
enforcement proceedings in the Dutch courts. The arbitration was
seated in Russia. Although the Russian Arbitrazh Courts had
subsequently set aside all of the Awards (“Russian Set-aside
Decisions”), the Dutch courts allowed Yukos Capital to enforce the
Awards, holding that the Russian courts had acted without
impartiality and independence. However, no payment was
forthcoming.
Yukos Capital then brought a second enforcement action in
England. It argued that, in light of the Dutch court’s judgment,
Rosneft could no longer rely on the Russian Set-aside Decisions to
annul the Awards. Rosneft argued, to the contrary, that the doctrine of
Act of State prohibited the English courts from questioning the
Russian Set-aside Decisions. The English Court of Appeal did not
agree with either proposition. It did not consider the Russian Set-aside
Decisions to be an Act of State, and Rosneft was not estopped from
relying on them.
The principal sums due under the Awards were eventually paid
by Rosneft but, as the Awards did not contain provisions for the
payment of interest, no interest was paid in respect of the delay in
payment. Accordingly, Yukos Capital continued its claim in the
English High Court for post-award interest. The claims for interest
were advanced under Article 395 of the Russian Civil Code and/or
Section 35 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“1981 Act”).
The English High Court was concerned with two preliminary
questions:
1. Whether the Russian Set-aside Decisions meant that the
Awards could not be enforced because they no longer existed in a
legal sense (“Enforcement Preliminary Issue”); and
5. [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm).
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2. Whether, in principle, interest could be recovered in respect of
such awards under Russian law and/or English law (“Interest
Preliminary Issue”).

On the Enforcement Preliminary Issue, Rosneft argued that the
Awards were made under and existed subject to Russian law. Since
the Awards had been annulled by the Russian courts in the Russian
Set-aside Decisions, they no longer existed and consequently there
was no obligation under Russian law to comply with them.
Accordingly, Rosneft contended that under the principle ex nihilo nil
fit,6 there were no legal grounds on which Yukos Capital could bring
an action in the English court.
Yukos Capital argued that an award could be enforced provided
that it was made in accordance with a valid arbitration agreement and
was final and binding according to its governing law and that for this
purpose it was not necessary for the award to be enforceable under the
law governing the arbitration. The court reviewed a considerable body
of academic opinion and case law on the question of whether an
award has legal effect notwithstanding an order of the court of the
seat annulling it:
[T]he answer to the question is not provided by a theory of legal
philosophy but by a test: whether the Court in considering
whether to give effect to an award can (in particular and
identifiable circumstances) treat it as having legal effect
notwithstanding a later order of a court annulling the award. In
applying this test it would be both unsatisfactory and contrary to
principle if the Court were bound to recognise a decision of a
foreign court which offended against basic principles of honesty,
natural justice and domestic concepts of public policy.7

Accordingly, the existence of the Russian Set-aside Decisions did not
automatically extinguish the Awards. It was open to Yukos Capital to
argue that the Russian Set-aside Decisions ought to be disregarded.
The question of whether the Awards in the present case were in fact
enforceable was left for later determination.8
On the Interest Preliminary Issue there were two distinct subissues considered by the High Court:
6. Latin maxim meaning “nothing comes out of nothing.”
7. [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm), supra note 5.
8. Following a trial determining, among other things, that Yukos Capital’s allegations
that the Russian Court Decisions should not be recognized, and (to the extent permissible)
Rosneft’s ‘public policy’ defense was based on an allegation of tax fraud.
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1. the claim for interest under Article 395 of the Russian Civil
Code; and
2. the claim for interest in English law under section 35A of the
1981 Act.

Having examined expert evidence adduced by the parties, the High
Court held that interest cannot be recovered as a matter of Russian
law. In respect of English law, Rosneft argued that the parties had
excluded the ability of the English Court to award interest by having
agreed that all disputes between them, including a dispute as to any
interest, should be resolved by an arbitral tribunal in Russia, and that
such tribunal had no power to award interest under Section 35A of the
1981 Act.
The High Court held that the enforcement action was a claim to
enforce a debt and therefore interest could be claimed as part of that
action even though it was not included in the underlying award.
Although the circumstances in which the arbitrators declined to grant
an award of interest might be relevant to the exercise of the English
Court’s discretion to award interest, the court held there was no
absolute bar to an award of interest in respect of the late payment of a
foreign award under Section 35A of the 1981 Act. Whether the
interest should be awarded as a matter of discretion in these particular
circumstances was also left for later determination.
The question of whether a party must object to jurisdiction (and
other preliminary issues or decisions) at certain stages of the arbitral
process has been the subject of debate in a number of cases
worldwide. In the English case Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v.
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan,9 Dallah was a
Saudi Arabian company which provided services for pilgrims
travelling to the Holy Places in Saudi Arabia. In July 1995, Dallah
signed a memorandum of understanding (“MoU”) with the
Government of Pakistan in relation to the construction of certain
housing for Pakistani pilgrims. In September 1996, Dallah entered
into a contract (“Contract”) with the Awami Hajj Trust (“Trust”), a
body which had been established by an Ordinance promulgated by the
President of Pakistan. The Contract contained an arbitration
agreement, under which all disputes were to be referred to
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration in Paris.
9. Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs,
Government of Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, 763 (Eng.).

818

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:3

The Government was not a signatory to the Contract, although
the Contract made reference to a guarantee to be provided by the
Government and included a provision by which the Trust could assign
its rights and obligations to the Government without the permission of
Dallah. The housing project never came to fruition and, following a
change of government in Pakistan, the Trust ceased to exist as a legal
entity. In May 1998, Dallah commenced ICC arbitration proceedings
against the government. In the arbitration, Dallah convinced the
arbitral tribunal—composed of three well-known arbitrators—that the
tribunal had jurisdiction over the government. The arbitral tribunal
issued three awards (successively on jurisdiction, applicable law, and
the merits) and awarded Dallah approximately US$20 million in
damages and legal costs. Dallah then endeavored to enforce the final
award in the United Kingdom. The government opposed enforcement
before the UK courts and commenced annulment proceedings against
all three awards before the Paris Court of Appeal.
The UK Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
the government, which was not a signatory to the Contract, should be
considered a party to the arbitration agreement (as an ICC tribunal
sitting in Paris had found), or whether enforcement of the tribunal’s
award could be refused under Article V(1)(a) of the New York
Convention because a proper application of French law led to the
conclusion that the Government was not a party to the arbitration
agreement. The UK Supreme Court held that, on a proper
interpretation of the New York Convention, whenever a party resists
enforcement under Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention (i.e.,
by claiming that the arbitration agreement was invalid), the Court is
bound to “revisit the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction.” The
Supreme Court also endorsed the position of the government that the
reviewing court “may have regard to the reasoning and findings of the
alleged arbitral tribunal, if they are helpful, but it is neither bound nor
restricted by them.”
The UK Supreme Court, in applying French law, purported to
follow the reasoning of the French Court of Cassation in the wellknown Dalico case to the extent that it analyzed the common
intention of the parties.10 It concluded that “there was no material
sufficient to justify the tribunal’s conclusion,” that the Government
10. Cour de Cassation [Cass.], First Civil Chamber, Municipalité de Khoms El
Mergeb v. Dalico, Dec. 20, 1993, JDI 1994, 432, note E. Gaillard.
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was a party to the arbitration agreement, and therefore refused to
enforce the award in the United Kingdom. In contrast, in 2011,
in Gouvernement du Pakistan—Ministère des Affaires Religieuses v.
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company,11 the Paris Court
of Appeal rejected an application by the Government of Pakistan to
set aside three ICC awards delivered in Paris, holding that the arbitral
tribunal was correct in finding it had jurisdiction over the government
despite it not being a signatory to the arbitration agreement
The Paris Court of Appeal followed the Dalico doctrine
whereby:
1. an international arbitration agreement is not governed by any
national law but by French “material rules” (règles
matérielles) of international arbitration;12 and
2. the issue of whether a party is bound by an arbitration clause
has to be solved by a factual enquiry, i.e. the court must assess
whether the parties intended to go to arbitration.

Following Dalico, the Paris Court retraced in detail the successive
steps of the project in order to analyze the dealings between the
parties.
The Paris Court noted that during the entire period prior to the
conclusion of the Contract, the Government was Dallah’s sole
counterpart/negotiating partner, in particular, that the government
negotiated the Contract directly, although the signatory, from a legal
standpoint, was the Trust. The Paris Court then emphasized that the
government was also involved during the performance of the
Contract, as evidenced, in particular, by the direct involvement of two
employees of the government in the organization of savings plans and
advertising campaigns related to the project. Finally, the Court
stressed that the government directly handled the termination of the
Contract.
In light of the above, the Paris Court of Appeal concluded that:
[The government] behaved as if the Contract was its own; . . .
this involvement of [the government], in the absence of evidence
that the Trust took any actions, as well as [the
government’s] behaviour during the pre-contractual negotiations,
11. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Gouvernement du Pakistane –
Ministère des Affaires Religieuses v. Societe Dallah Real Estate Tourism and Holding
Company, civ., Feb. 17, 2011, 09/28533.
12. Rules applied by a French court without a conflict of laws analysis.
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confirm that the creation of the Trust was purely formal and
that [the government] was in fact the true Pakistani party in the
course of the economic transaction.

The Court thus rejected the Government’s request.13 Both the UK and
French courts concluded that they had authority to conduct a full
review of the arbitrators’ decision on jurisdiction. With regards to
French law, this decision is consistent with well-established case law.
To some extent the position in Asia is still being developed as
courts there grapple with establishing jurisprudence that suit their
policies and principles. As far as enforcement in Asia is concerned
there are a few common relevant principles that apply:
1. The primary aim of the court is to facilitate the arbitral process
and to assist with enforcement of arbitral awards.
2. Under most arbitration laws, the court should interfere in the
arbitration of the dispute only as expressly provided for in the
law.
3. Subject to the observance of the safeguards that are necessary
in the public interest, the parties to a dispute should be free to
agree on how their dispute should be resolved.

The grounds that arise most often are:
1. not having been given notice of the arbitral proceedings,
2. inability to present one’s case, or
3. that the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

On applications to set aside or to refuse enforcement on any of those
grounds, the court is concerned with the structural integrity of the
arbitration proceedings. In this regard, the conduct complained of
“must be serious, even egregious,” before the court would find that
there was an error sufficiently serious so as to have undermined due
process.14 Thus, it is fair to say that in drawing on recent case law on
the issue of enforcement a number of principles emerge (particularly
from the courts in Hong Kong):

13. Furthermore, the court ordered the Government to pay the full amount of legal fees
claimed by Dallah, (€100,000) under Article 700 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.
14. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd. v. Pacific China Holdings Ltd. [2012] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 1
(CA).
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1. The courts are prepared to enforce awards except where
complaints of substance can be made good.
2 The party opposing enforcement has to show a real risk of
prejudice and that its rights are shown to have been violated in a
material way.15
3. Failure to make prompt objection to the tribunal or the
supervisory court may constitute estoppel or want of bona fide.16
4. In considering whether or not to refuse the enforcement of the
award, the court does not look into the merits or at the underlying
transaction.17
5. Even if sufficient grounds are made out either to refuse
enforcement or to set aside an arbitral award, the court has a
residual discretion and may nevertheless enforce the award
despite the proven existence of a valid ground.18
6. In addition, the Court of Final Appeal (HK) has clearly
recognized that parties to the arbitration have a duty of good
faith, or to act bona fide.19

In Malaysia, in Agrovenus LLP v. Pacific Inter-Link,20 the award
debtor sought to resist enforcement of the award on the ground that
the tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties
(s.39 of Arbitration Act 2005 (Malaysia)). The opposing party argued
that as the award debtor had not raised any objection to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction throughout the arbitration proceedings, the award debtor
was now estopped from raising such objections to the court. At first
instance, the judge held that it had the ability to evaluate the tribunal’s
jurisdiction despite the jurisdictional issue having not been raised at
an earlier time (in line with English decision of Dallah). The Court of
Appeal, overturned the High Court’s decision, holding that the award
debtor was effectively estopped from challenging the tribunal’s
jurisdiction after the award had already been rendered, citing Rustall
Trading Ltd v. Gill & Duffus SA:

15. Id.
16. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd. [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R.
111 (CFA).
17. Xiamen Xingjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd. [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353
(CA).
18. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co. Ltd. [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R.
111, supra note 16, at 136A-B.
19. Id. at 1201, 137B.
20. [2014] 4 C.L.J. 525.
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. . . a party to an arbitration must act promptly if he considered
that there were grounds on which he could challenge the
effectiveness of the proceedings; if he failed to do so and
continued to take party in the proceedings, he would be
precluded from making a challenge at a later date.21

This position is to be contrasted with the position in Singapore in a
number of respects. Astro Nusantara v. PT Ayunda22 concerns the
arbitration proceedings arising out of a joint venture for the provision
of multimedia services in Indonesia.
The dispute between the parties arose out of a joint venture
agreement called the Subscription and Shareholders’ Agreement
(“SSA”), dated March 11, 2005, entered into between companies
belonging to an Indonesian conglomerate (“Lippo Group”) on the one
hand and companies within a Malaysian media group (“Astro
Group”) on the other for the provision of multimedia and television
services in Indonesia. The joint venture vehicle was the third
defendant in these proceedings (“Direct Vision”). The Lippo Group’s
interest in the joint venture was held by the first defendant in these
proceedings, Ayunda, whose obligations to the Astro Group under the
joint venture were guaranteed by First Media, an Indonesian company
with its shares listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. On the other
hand, the Astro Group’s interest in the joint venture was held by the
third and fourth applicants, with the fifth applicant guaranteeing their
obligations. The original parties to the SSA were the third to fifth
applicants on the side of the Astro Group, and Ayunda, First Media
and Direct Vision (collectively referred to as “Lippo”) on the side of
the Lippo Group. Subsequently, pursuant to a novation agreement, the
first and second applicants took the place of the third and fourth
applicants in the joint venture. The Additional Parties were, however,
never made parties to the SSA.
Clause 18.5 of the SSA provided that the agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. The SSA contained a number of conditions
precedent upon which the parties’ respective obligations thereunder
were predicated. It was agreed that the parties would have until July
21. [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 228.
22. Astro Nusantara Int’l BV and Others v. PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and Others [2013] 1
SLR 636 (first instance); PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia
TBK) v. Astro Nusantara Int’l BV and Others [2014] 1 SLR 372 (Court of Appeal).
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2006 to fulfil those conditions precedent. In the meantime, funds and
services were provided by the Additional Parties to Direct Vision to
build up the latter’s business from about December 2005.
As a matter of fact, the conditions precedent were not fulfilled.
By about mid-August 2007, it became clear to the parties that the
joint venture would not close. Nevertheless, the Additional Parties
continued to provide funds and services to Direct Vision while the
parties were exploring exit options. A dispute then arose between
Lippo and Astro. Lippo contended that the Additional Parties had,
orally or by conduct, agreed to continue to provide funds and services
to Direct Vision, but Astro was not willing to do so.
In October 2008, the Additional Parties stopped further
provision of funds and services to Direct Vision. In the meantime, in
September 2009, Ayunda commenced proceedings in the Indonesian
court against, inter alia, the Additional Parties (“Indonesian
Proceedings"). On the basis that the commencement of the Indonesian
Proceedings amounted to a breach of the arbitration agreement
contained in the SSA, Astro commenced arbitration at the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) by a notice of arbitration
dated October 6, 2008 against Lippo (“the Arbitration”).
In the notice of arbitration, Astro sought, inter alia, the
following relief against Lippo:
1. an anti-suit injunction against Ayunda in respect of the
Indonesian Proceedings;
2. declarations that the SSA was the parties’ only joint venture
agreement which had lapsed and there was no continuing
obligation on the part of Astro to continue to provide funds and
services to Direct Vision; and
3. payment of various sums by way of restitution and/or quantum
meruit.

In view of the fact that the Additional Parties were not parties to the
SSA, Astro stated in the notice of arbitration that the Additional
Parties had consented to being added as parties to the Arbitration, and
made an application pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the 2007 SIAC Rules
to join the Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration (“Joinder
Application”).
Rule 24(b), under the heading of “Additional Powers of the
Tribunal,” states as follows:
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In addition and not in derogation of the powers conferred by any
applicable law of the arbitration, the Tribunal shall have the
power to:
...
b. allow other parties to be joined in the arbitration with
their express consent, and make a single final award
determining all disputes among the parties to the
arbitration.

The Joinder Application was contested by Lippo. On May 7, 2009,
the Tribunal rendered an award (“Award on Preliminary Issues”),
holding that:
1. on the true construction of Rule 24(b), it had power to join the
Additional Parties as parties to the Arbitration as long as they
consented to being joined; and
2. the power to join the Additional Parties as parties to the
Arbitration should be exercised.

Lippo did not challenge the Tribunal’s preliminary award on
jurisdiction before the Singapore Courts within the thirty-day time
limit under Article 16(3) of the Model Law. Instead, it continued to
participate in the arbitration, but noted its continued objection to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Although relief was granted to all eight
applicants under the Awards, the principal monetary relief awarded
by the Tribunal was in favor of the Astro Joinder Parties (the sixth to
eighth applicants). Between May 7, 2009 and August 3, 2010, the
Tribunal issued four further awards in Astro’s favor in excess of
US$130 million.23
Astro sought enforcement of the Awards in various jurisdictions,
including Singapore, Hong Kong, England, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Lippo did not resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement
of the Awards in England or Malaysia, because Lippo had no assets in
those jurisdictions on which execution of the judgments giving effect
to the Awards could be levied. For the same reason, Lippo did not
originally take steps to resist proceedings for the recognition and
enforcement of the Awards in Hong Kong, but subsequently adopted
a different stance when it transpired that there were assets of Lippo to
be found here (disputed by Lippo). Lippo did take active steps to

23. The arbitral tribunal constituted of very eminent and experienced practitioners: Sir
Gordon Langley, Sir Simon Tuckey, and Stewart C Boyd CBE QC.
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resist proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the Awards
in Indonesia on various grounds.
The focus of the parties’ arguments before the Hong Kong and
Singapore courts related to the enforcement of the Awards by the
Additional Parties against First Media. In Hong Kong, the
enforcement had occurred without any significant challenge grounded
on the joinder issue. In Singapore, the seat of the arbitration, the
joinder issue was raised not in a setting aside application but in
defense of an enforcement application.
In view of the fact that the seat of the Arbitration was in
Singapore, the Awards were regarded as “domestic international
awards” in so far as proceedings for their recognition and
enforcement in Singapore were concerned. The statutory regime
governing the enforcement of a domestic international award in
Singapore is Section 19 of the International Arbitration Act (“IAA”),
which states, “An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of
the High Court or a Judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as
a judgment or an order to the same effect and, where leave is so
given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.”24
The following provisions of the 1985 Model Law are also relevant for
the purposes of properly understanding the decision:
(1) Article 16(3): “The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea
referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article [i.e., a plea that the
arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction] either as a
preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral
tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction,
any party may request, within thirty days after having received
notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the
matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such a
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral
proceedings and make an award.”
(2) Article 34(1): “Recourse to a court against an arbitral award
may be made only by an application for setting aside in
accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article.”
(3) Article 34(2): “An arbitral award may be set aside by the
court specified in article 6 only if (a) the party making the
application furnishes proof that: (i) . . . the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or …

24. Cap 143A, 2002 Rev. Ed.
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(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration . . . .”
(4) Article 34(3): “An application for setting aside may not be
made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received the award . . . .”
(5) Article 36(1): “Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral
award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be
refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where
recognition or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) . . . the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or . . . (iii) the award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration . . . .”

The Lippo companies did not apply to set aside the Awards in
Singapore based on the grounds of Article 34(1) ML within the time
limit. Astro subsequently sought to enforce the Awards in Singapore
by the High Court. In response, Lippo challenged the enforcement
orders on the jurisdictional ground that there was no agreement to
arbitrate between the Lippo and the Astro Joinder Parties, who were
not parties to the SSA.
The Singapore High Court, in dismissing the challenge held that
there was no statutory basis to invoke lack of jurisdiction as a ground
to resist or refuse enforcement of a Singapore Award. Further, the
Court held that a domestic international award is recognized as final
and binding, unless, and exclusively so, it is set aside under the
grounds stipulated under the IAA. At first instance in the High Court
of Singapore, the judge interpreted Article 16(3) of the Model Law as
the “exclusive route” through which a preliminary decision on
jurisdiction can be challenged. Once the time limit for bringing a
challenge under Article 16(3) has elapsed without any application
having been made, the preliminary ruling on jurisdiction becomes
final and cannot be challenged subsequently, whether by way of a
setting-aside application or at the enforcement stage. As the Lippo
parties did not challenge the Award on Preliminary Issues under
Article 16(3) of the Model Law, the judge held that it had lost its sole
and exclusive opportunity to raise its jurisdictional objection before
the Singapore courts. It was therefore no longer open to a Singapore
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court to revisit the jurisdictional objection. The Matter then proceeded
to an appeal to the Court of Appeal, where the Court of Appeal was
asked to deal with the question of whether Lippo was estopped from
pursuing a passive remedy.
While the validity of the Awards could no longer be challenged
by First Media before the Singapore court, being the supervisory
court of the arbitration, enforcement of the Awards by the Additional
Parties against First Media was refused by the Singapore Court of
Appeal by a judgment of that court rendered on October 31, 2013, on
the ground that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the
Additional Parties and First Media and the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to make the Awards in favor of the Additional Parties
against First Media. On appeal, the Singapore Court of Appeal,
examined the development of the law of arbitration in Singapore since
the first enactment of its arbitration legislation, the subsequent
adoption of the Model Law and the New York Convention, as well as
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working
Group’s travaux preparatoires in relation to the Model Law.
It also referred to pronouncements by other courts as to the
implications of the New York Convention on whether and how the
pursuit of active remedies in the seat of arbitration might be relevant
to enforcement proceedings. In particular, the court referred to the
decision of the UK Supreme Court in Dallah. In Dallah, Lord Mance
noted that Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention accorded
some deference and importance to the seat of arbitration, but went on
to say the following, with which the Singapore Court of Appeal
agreed:
But article V(1)(a) and section 103(2)(b) [the section in the
English Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) which gives effect to the
New York Convention] are framed as free-standing and categoric
alternative grounds to article V(1)(e) of the Convention and
section 103(2)(f) for resisting recognition or enforcement.
Neither article V(1)(a) nor section 103(2)(b) hints at any
restriction on the nature of the exercise open, either to the person
resisting enforcement or to the court asked to enforce an award,
when the validity (sc existence) of the supposed arbitration
agreement is in issue. The onus may be on the person resisting
recognition or enforcement, but the language enables such person
to do so by proving (or furnishing proof) of the non-existence of
any arbitration agreement. This language points strongly to
ordinary judicial determination of that issue. Nor do article VI
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and section 103(5) contain any suggestion that a person resisting
recognition or enforcement in one country has any obligation to
seek to set aside the award in the other country where it was
made.25

A close examination of the development of and difference in the
Model Law and New York Convention allows for an argument said to
be established by the “choice of remedies” principle. The Singapore
Court of Appeal said:
The drafters of the Model Law, in aligning the Model Law with
the New York Convention, were plainly desirous of continuing
this trend of de-emphasising the importance of the seat of
arbitration. However, there was and is one significant difference
between the New York Convention and the Model Law. Unlike
the New York Convention which only dealt with enforcement of
awards, the Model Law also dealt with the setting aside of
awards made in the seat of arbitration by the courts of that seat.
This other avenue to challenge domestic awards resulted in the
possibility that the enforcement of awards originating from
within the jurisdiction of the supervisory court would be treated
differently from that of foreign awards. This is where ‘choice of
remedies’ becomes significant and forms the crux of this
dispute.26

Contrary to the view of the judge at first instance, the Court
interpreted Section 19 of the IAA as providing the Singapore Court
with an inherent power to refuse the enforcement of domestic
international awards rendered in Singapore.
Drawing on earlier iterations of the wording of Section 19 in
enactments prior to the IAA (which had in turn come from the 1950
Arbitration Act) and English case law, the court determined that
historically a “choice of remedies” was enshrined within Singapore
law. This provided two options for a party against whom an award
was rendered:
1. an “active remedy” of setting aside the award; or
2. a “passive remedy” of resisting enforcement by the
counterparty, which was available even where no active
challenge had been made.

25. PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV & Ors SGCA 57, at 28
(2013).
26. Id. at 64.
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The Court did not consider this position had been altered by the
introduction of the Model Law through the IAA. Therefore, it was
held that “Parliament, in receiving the Model Law into Singapore,
intended to retain for the courts the power to refuse enforcement of
domestic international awards under s 19, even if the award could
have been but was not attacked by an active remedy.”27 The
Singapore Court of Appeal examined and then applied the following
principles in reaching its decision:
(1) The enforcement of domestic international awards is
governed by s.19 of the IAA, the construction of which must be
consonant with the underlying philosophy of the Model Law.
(2) The overarching scheme of the Model Law is to deemphasize the importance of the seat of the arbitration and
facilitate the uniform treatment of international arbitration
awards.
(3) The principle of “choice of remedies,” under which passive
remedies will still be available to the award debtor who did not
utilize his active remedies, is fundamental to the design of the
Model Law. In this connection,
(i) “active remedies” means taking positive steps to
invalidate an arbitral award such as by an application to
challenge a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction under article
16(3) of the Model Law or to set aside an award on the
grounds set out in article 34(1) of the Model Law,
(ii) “passive remedies” means resisting the recognition or
enforcement of an award in the jurisdiction where and
when the award is sought to be enforced under article 36 of
the Model Law; and
(iii) “choice of remedies” means the award debtor may
resist enforcement of an award by “passive” means even
though it had not pursued “active” remedies to challenge
the preliminary ruling or set aside the award.
(4) It follows that the best way to give effect to the philosophy of
the Model Law would be to recognize that the same grounds for
resisting enforcement under Article 36(1) of the Model Law will
be equally available under s 19 of the IAA.
(5) Article 16(3) of the Model Law is neither an exception to the
principle of “choice of remedies,” nor a “one-shot remedy”
27. Id. at 47.
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(meaning that a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction must be
challenged within the prescribed thirty-day time limit, failing
which the party objecting to the ruling will be deprived of any
other chance to subsequently raise the same jurisdictional ground
in setting aside or enforcement proceedings, and if the
preliminary ruling is challenged but not set aside by the
supervisory court, the party objecting to jurisdiction cannot raise
the same grounds in any subsequent application to set aside the
award before the supervisory court, or to resist enforcement of
the award before the enforcement court, irrespective of whether
the latter is in the same jurisdiction as the supervisory court or
elsewhere).
(6) As such, pursuant to s 19 of the IAA, First Media may apply
to set aside the Singapore Enforcement Orders under any of the
grounds which are found in article 36(1) of the Model Law, even
though it did not pursue “active remedies” to challenge the
Award on Preliminary Issues under Article 16(3) of the Model
Law or set aside the Awards under Article 34(1) of the Model
Law.
(7) It is a matter to be determined by Singapore law whether the
Additional Parties were properly joined to the Arbitration so as to
establish an arbitration agreement with First Media.
(8) Upon the true construction of Rule 24(b), it does not confer
on the Tribunal the power to join third parties who are not parties
to the arbitration agreement (i.e., the SSA in the present case)
into the Arbitration.
(9) Accordingly, the Tribunal’s exercise of its power under Rule
24(b) to join the Additional Parties to the Arbitration was
improper with the corollary that no express agreement to arbitrate
existed between the Additional Parties and First Media.
(10) In addition, First Media did not waive its rights or conduct
itself in such a way that it was estopped from raising the joinder
objection.
(11) First Media is entitled to resist the enforcement of the
Awards pursuant to s 19 of the IAA.
(12) Nevertheless, partial enforcement of the Awards in favor of
the first to fifth applicants (whom First Media did not dispute
were proper parties to the SSA and the Arbitration) was viable,
and leave to enforce the Awards, to the extent of those parts
which are exclusively directed at the first to fifth applicants, was
granted.
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Thus, the court rejected the submission that Article 16(3) of the
Model law was a mandatory route that must be followed. The Court
of Appeal held that there was no evidence that the drafters intended to
override the co-existence of active and passive remedies. Article
16(3) of the Model Law constituted “neither an exception to the
‘choice of remedies’ policy of the Model Law, nor a ‘one-shot
remedy.’” Consequently, leave was granted to appeal on the
substantive point of joinder. On the joinder issue, therefore, the court
held that since there was no agreement to arbitrate between Lippo and
the Astro Joinder Parties, the Tribunal had erred in joining the Astro
Joinder Parties, and the Awards could not be enforced against Lippo
by those parties.
This is consistent with the position in England. In Dallah, Lord
Collins of Mapesbury stated:
[c]onsequently, in an international commercial arbitration a party
which objects to the jurisdiction of the tribunal has two options.
It can challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the courts of the
arbitral seat; and it can resist enforcement in the court before
which the award is brought for recognition and enforcement.
These two options are not mutually exclusive, although in some
cases a determination by the court of the seat may give rise to an
issue estoppel or other preclusive effect in the court in which
enforcement is sought. The fact that jurisdiction can no longer be
challenged in the courts of the seat does not preclude
consideration of the tribunal’s jurisdiction by the enforcing
courts.28

It was recognized by the Court of Appeal that not overruling the
judge’s decision at first instance would have the unwanted effect of
constraining party autonomy and compelling parties in international
arbitrations seated in Singapore to raise active challenges with the
courts. For this reason, when reaching its decision, the Court of
Appeal was cognizant of the “practical ramifications” and “potentially
far-reaching implications on the practice and flourishing of arbitration
in Singapore.”29
Thus, through its purposive interpretation of the IAA, the Court
of Appeal has confirmed that a “choice of remedies” for domestic
international awards rendered in Singapore has been retained in the
28. Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of
Pakistan 1 AC 763 (2010), at 98.
29. Id. at 90.
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IAA, bringing the position in Singapore into line with the Model Law
as well as other key arbitration jurisdictions, including its regional
competitor, Hong Kong. Accordingly, parties involved in
international arbitrations seated in Singapore will be afforded the
freedom to choose whether to make an active challenge to an award
(which may have its own advantages) or wait until the award is
sought to be enforced in Singapore, depending on tactical
considerations, including cost, efficiency, and timing.
However, before the enforcement proceedings in Singapore took
place, the matter was also in the courts for enforcement proceedings
in Hong Kong in Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First
Media.30 In 2010, the Hong Kong High Court on application from
Astro, granted leave to Astro to enforce the awards as judgments and
directed First Media (Lippo) to apply, if it so chose to do, to set aside
the orders of the Court within fourteen days of service. No application
was made to set aside the Hong Kong orders and, therefore, judgment
was entered in Hong Kong against First Media. Further, no
application having been made by First Media, in July 2011, Astro
obtained a garnishee order to attach a debt due to First Media from
one of its majority shareholders. First Media then made two
applications to the High Court of Hong Kong seeking:
1. An extension of time to set aside two court orders made by the
court in September 2010 granting leave to Astro to enforce five
arbitration awards against First Media.
2. To set aside these court orders.

In those applications, the Court was required to consider whether
valid grounds existed for granting an extension of time to apply to set
aside the court orders fourteen months after the expiry of the
prescribed period.
Astro argued on five substantive grounds:
(1) The Awards, being valid and binding and not having been set
aside, have been entered as judgments in Hong Kong. There was
no machinery to permit any challenge of such judgments,
whether under s 44 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 341
(“Ordinance”) or otherwise, except by way of an appeal to the
Court of Appeal.

30. Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, HCCT 45/2010.
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(2) There were no valid grounds to extend the time to apply to set
aside the Hong Kong Orders and Hong Kong Judgment fourteen
months after the period prescribed by the Orders for making such
application has expired.
(3) Further, there was no valid basis under Hong Kong law at the
enforcement stage for First Media to challenge the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to make the Awards when it lost its challenge in a
ruling on a preliminary issue by the Tribunal and then
deliberately decided not to challenge that ruling in court but
chose to defend the claims on the merits. First Media’s conduct is
said to be not consonant with the principle of good faith, or
amount to an implied waiver or give rise to an estoppel.
(4) In any event, the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction was
correct, and the Hong Kong court was not bound by the decision
of another enforcing court, namely, the Singapore Court of
Appeal.
(5) Further, and in any event, the Tribunal made a further finding
in the Interim Final Award, namely, that First Media in the
course of defending the merits had, by signing the Memorandum
of Issues with its particular wording and without reservation,
signed a further agreement for the arbitration of the issues
identified in the memorandum. This, it was said, amounted to a
binding submission to arbitration of those issues. The Interim
Final Award has not been challenged or set aside and remained
valid and binding. The reasoning of the Tribunal on this further
submission was unimpeachable, and was not addressed by the
Singapore Courts in the enforcement proceedings in that
jurisdiction.

The Court held that there was no basis for accepting a rigid rule
which would preclude an enforcement order from challenge as soon
as judgment is entered to give effect to the arbitration award. Section
44(1) of the Ordinance provides that enforcement of a Convention
award shall not be refused except in the cases mentioned in that
section. Section 44(2) of the Ordinance goes to state (inter alia) as
follows:
Enforcement of a Convention award may be refused if the person
against whom it is invoked proves –
(b) that the arbitration agreement was not valid to which
the parties subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made; or
...
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(d) subject to subsection(4), that the award deals with a
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration or contains decision
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration.

In addition, s.44(3) of the Ordinance, states, relevantly,
[e]nforcement of a Convention award may also be refused if the
award is in respect of a matter which is not capable of settlement
by arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to
enforce the award.

In considering ground 3 put forward by the Astro parties, the Court
said that the following basic principles should be borne in mind:
(1) s.44 of the Ordinance represents the statutory enactment of
article V of the New York Convention.
(2) The Hong Kong courts approach Convention awards with a
pro-enforcement bias: see Werner A Bock KG v The N’s Co Ltd
[1978] HKLR 281 at 285 per Huggins JA; China Nanhai Oil
Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings
Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKLR 215 at 226 per Kaplan J; Hebei Import &
Export Corp. v Polyteck Engineering Co. Ltd. (1999) 2 HKCFAR
111 at 136A-B per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ; Societe Nationale
D’Operations Petrolieres de la Cote d’Ivoire-Holding v Keen
Lloyd Resources Ltd [2004] 3 HKC 452, at paragraph 14 per
Burrell J.
(3) Enforcement of a Convention award is mandatory unless a
case under s.44(2) or (3) of the Ordinance is made out, in which
case the court has a discretion to permit or refuse enforcement.
(4) The fact that an arbitral award has been refused enforcement
by a court in another jurisdiction, even one whose law governs
the arbitration agreement or the procedures of the arbitration
(sometimes referred to as the curial law), is not a ground for
resisting enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong under
the New York Convention, because different jurisdictions have
different rules, laws and regulations governing enforcement of
arbitral awards.31 In principle, this should be the position even
where the court in that other jurisdiction also applies the New
York Convention in denying enforcement of the arbitral award,
because the Hong Kong court applies s.44 of the Ordinance as a
31. Societe Nationale D’Operations Petrolieres de la Cote d’Ivoire-Holding v. Keen
Lloyd Resources Ltd., at para. 14 per Burrell J.
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piece of domestic legislation, although it would obviously be
desirable for different jurisdictions applying the New York
Convention to do so in a consistent manner.
(5) Whether a ground has been made out for refusing to enforce a
Convention award under s.44(2) and (3) of the Ordinance is a
matter governed by Hong Kong law and to be determined by the
Hong Kong court. In Hebei Import & Export Corp. v Polyteck
Engineering Co. Ltd., supra, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ stated at
136C-E that the Convention distinguished between proceedings
to set aside an award in the court of supervisory jurisdiction and
proceedings in the court of enforcement. Proceedings to set aside
are governed by the law under which the award was made or the
law of the place where it was made, while proceedings in the
court of enforcement are governed by the law of that forum.32

In Hebei, Sir Anthony Mason went on to say that where enforcement
of an award is resisted on the ground of “public policy” under s.44(3)
of the Ordinance, the relevant public policy is that of the jurisdiction
in which enforcement is sought.33 The court held that this is also the
position where a party seeks to resist enforcement of an arbitral award
on one or more of the discretionary grounds under s. 44(2) of the
Ordinance. In such a case, the Hong Kong court should apply its own
jurisprudence regarding the exercise of its discretion under that
section, and approach the matter as one governed by Hong Kong law.
The court held that First Media should not be permitted to resist
enforcement of the awards on the principle of good faith, as First
Media did not challenge the tribunal’s preliminary ruling on
jurisdiction and instead sought to defend its claims on the merits in
the arbitration. The court also stated that a Hong Kong court was
bound by the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal because it
was the enforcing court. The Court held that First Media was not
entitled to an extension and dismissed the setting aside application,
citing the following reasons:
1. First Media’s application to set aside the orders for
enforcement was made fourteen months out of time.
2. The Court was not prepared to exercise its discretion to extend
the time for First Media’s application given that the delay was
substantial and a result of First Media’s tactical decision to not

32. Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, supra note 30, at 73.
33. 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111, at 136G-H (2001).
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resist enforcement in Hong Kong and the awards had not been set
aside and were valid and binding on First Media itself.
3. The Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision was final and
conclusive as to whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to join the
other parties into the arbitration.

The court referred to two decisions in support of the proposition that
the court has a discretion under s.44(2) of the Ordinance to decline to
refuse enforcement, even if a ground for refusal might otherwise be
made out, in circumstances where there has been a breach of the good
faith, or bona fide, principle on the part of the award debtor: China
Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings
Co. Ltd. and Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering
Co. Ltd.34
In China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen
Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd.,35 the court held that there was a
general duty of good faith which was distinct from principles of
estoppel (and presumably waiver) under domestic or municipal laws.
Justice Kaplan said in that case in relation to the application of the
principle of good faith:
It strikes me as quite unfair for a party to appreciate that there
might be something wrong with the composition of the tribunal
yet not make any formal submission whatsoever to the tribunal
about its own jurisdiction, or to the arbitration commission which
constituted the tribunal and then to proceed to fight the case on
the merits and then 2 years after the award attempt to nullify the
whole proceedings on the grounds that the arbitrators were
chosen from the wrong CIETAC list. I think there is much force
in Dr. van den Berg’s point that even if a ground of opposition is
proved, there is still a residual discretion left in the enforcing
court to enforce nonetheless. This shows that the grounds of
opposition are not to be inflexibly applied. The residual
discretion enables the enforcing court to achieve a just result in
all the circumstances although I accept that in many cases where
a ground of opposition is established, the discretion is unlikely to
be exercised in favour of enforcement. If the enforcing court was
obliged to refuse enforcement in the event of the establishing of a
34. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd.
[1994] 3 HKC 375; Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering Co. Ltd. 39383
[1995] 2 HKLR 215.
35. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co.
Ltd., supra note 34.
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ground of opposition, I believe that it would be far harder to
import the doctrine of estoppel. But a discretion there is, and I for
myself are prepared to hold that on a true construction of the
Convention there is indeed a duty of good faith which in the
circumstances of this case required the Defendant to bring to the
notice of the full tribunal or the CIETAC Commission in Beijing
its objections to the formation of this particular arbitral tribunal.
Its failure to do so and its obvious policy of keeping this point up
its sleeve to be pulled out only if the arbitration was lost, is not
one that I find consistent with the obligation of good faith nor
with any notions of justice and fair play.36

The Court of Final Appeal in Hebei, stated in relation to the failure by
a party to raise an objection but instead continue participating in the
arbitration as follows:
The respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of the principle
that a party to an arbitration who wishes to rely on a noncompliance with the rules governing an arbitration shall do so
promptly and shall not proceed with the arbitration as if there had
been no compliance, keeping the point up his sleeve for later
use.37

Hence, First Media’s failure to challenge the tribunal’s preliminary
ruling on jurisdiction amounted to a breach of the principle of good
faith. Chow J stated that he had the discretion to refuse enforcement if
the party’s conduct was found to be in breach of good faith. On good
faith, the Court stated:
. . . it seems clear that what First Media decided to do was to
defend the claim on the merits in the hope that it would succeed
before the Tribunal, and keep the jurisdictional point in reserve to
be deployed in the enforcement court only when it suited its
interests to do so. The fact that First Media did raise the objection
with the Tribunal should not, in my view, make any difference
having regard to its subsequent conduct [during the arbitration] . .
. . First Media should not be permitted to rely on s.44(2) of the
Ordinance to resist enforcement of the awards because it has
acted in breach of the good faith, or bona fide, principle.38
36. China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd.
[1995] 2 HKLR 215, at 225.
37. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polyteck Engineering Co. Ltd. [1999] 2
H.K.C.F.A.R. 111 (C.F.A.), at 137.
38. Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media, supra note 30, at 44.
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Although First Media had successfully resisted the enforcement of the
Awards before the Singapore Court of Appeal, the Singapore court
was acting in its capacity as the enforcement court and not as
supervisory court. The Awards have not been set aside. They are still
valid and created legally binding obligations on First Media to satisfy
them.
We come full circle with the distinction between setting aside
proceedings and enforcement proceedings and the respective powers
exercisable by each court in each scenario. This distinction has been
held to be a well-understood and accepted conceptual difference, in
that, setting-aside proceedings are a means of “recourse against the
award,” that is, they are proceedings to attack the award itself. If
successful, the award is annulled and, in many cases, no longer exists.
The legal and practical consequence is that, generally speaking, the
award is no longer capable of enforcement anywhere else. It also
means, generally, that the award no longer binds the parties and fresh
proceedings may be commenced.
This is very different from a party merely raising defenses to
enforcement. A court’s ruling on whether to enforce an award within
its own jurisdiction is not an attack against the award itself but a
statement by the court that it will not lend its aid to the enforcement
of the award in that jurisdiction. The effect of such a ruling is, in
principle, confined to that jurisdiction alone and it is possible for an
award to be refused enforcement in one jurisdiction but enforced in
another.
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, it is far from clear and the
debate will continue for some time to come.

